Questioning Unlimited Veto Use in Face of Atrocity Crimes by Trahan, Jennifer
Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 
Volume 52 Issue 1 Article 7 
2020 
Questioning Unlimited Veto Use in Face of Atrocity Crimes 
Jennifer Trahan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer Trahan, Questioning Unlimited Veto Use in Face of Atrocity Crimes, 52 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 73 
(2020) 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol52/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
73 
Questioning Unlimited Veto Use 
in the Face of Atrocity Crimes 
Jennifer Trahan1 
Table of Contents  
Table of Contents ............................................................................ 73 
Drafting of the UN Charter ........................................................... 74 
Cold War Veto Use .......................................................................... 75 
Post-Cold War ................................................................................. 77 
Veto Use or Threats While Atrocity Crimes Are Ongoing ........... 77 
Voluntary Veto Restraint Initiatives ............................................ 85 
The Responsibility Not to Veto ............................................................86 
The “S5” Initiative .............................................................................86 
The French/Mexican Initiative ............................................................87 
The ACT Code of Conduct .................................................................88 
Examining Existing Legal Limits to Veto Use in the Face of 
Atrocity Crimes ....................................................................... 90 
The Veto and Jus Cogens ...................................................................91 
The Veto and the UN Charter .............................................................95 
The Veto and Foundational Treaties ....................................................97 
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 100 
 
This article discusses the need to re-visit—based on existing legal 
obligations—the problem of veto use by the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council while there are ongoing atrocity crimes (genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes). Specifically, the article—
which previews the arguments in my forthcoming book—raises the 
question of whether all such veto use is consistent with international 
law.2 
 
1. Jennifer Trahan is Clinical Professor and Director of the Concentration 
in International Law and Human Rights at The Center for Global Affairs, 
NYU-SPS.  A version of these remarks first appeared in the Proceedings 
of the Twelfth International Humanitarian Law Dialogs (ASIL Studies in 
Transnational Legal Policy, No. 51), published by the American Society 
of International Law. 
2. The topics explored in this article are discussed far more extensively in 
JENNIFER TRAHAN, EXISTING LEGAL LIMITS TO SECURITY COUNCIL VETO 
POWER IN THE FACE OF ATROCITY CRIMES (forthcoming CUP June 2020).  
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Drafting of the UN Charter 
If one reflects back on the early drafting of what became the UN 
Charter, with negotiations primarily conducted by the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Soviet Union at Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks,3 it 
was the Soviet Union that insisted on the veto power, which at that 
point was referred to as “the principle of unanimity.”4 The United 
States and United Kingdom did not originally insist on it, and thought 
there should be a carve-out if a permanent member were a party to the 
situation being voted on—that the permanent member should be 
excluded from voting (and, hence, also veto use).5 That concept, 
however, fell to the wayside, upon Soviet insistence, at least for votes 
under Chapter VII.6  
In the negotiations at San Francisco, non-permanent member states 
mounted significant “pushback” to the concept of the veto power and 
suggested various limitations, but did not prevail.7 The sentiment 
seemed to be that if the permanent members were going to be the major 
troop-contributing countries to the newly forming UN, then they should 
have this extraordinary power.8 In the end, the permanent members 
quite simply would not agree to a Charter without the veto power.9 
Thus, in 1945, while there was a broad conception of veto power, 
it was seen primarily as necessary for the permanent members to be  
3. See 1943: Moscow and Teheran Conferences, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1943-
moscow-and-teheran-conferences/index.html [https://perma.cc/NSM7-
6ZUH]. 
4. The Soviet Union argued that the “principle of unanimity” was critical in 
the negotiations. See, e.g., The Chairman of the Council of People’s 
Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt, 1 FOR. 
REL. 806 (1944); Memorandum from Joseph Stalin to President Franklin 
Roosevelt (Apr. 3, 1945) (on file with Office of the Historian) (explaining 
that the Soviet Union argued that the “principle of unanimity” was 
critical in the negotiations). 
5. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council’s First Fifty Years, 89 AM. 
J. OF INT’L L. 506, 507 (1995). 
6. Cf. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3 (“[I]n decisions under Chapter VI, and under 
paragraph 3 of Article 52 [pacific settlement of disputes through regional 
arrangements], a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”).  
7. See Kirgis, supra note 5, at 507. 
8. EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOW SHARES: THE PROBLEMS 
AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 73 (Inis L. Claude, Jr. 
ed., 4th ed. 1971). 
9. One of the U.S. delegates famously threatened that the other states could 
get rid of the veto power, but they could also forget about having a 
Charter, and dramatically tore up his draft of the Charter. EDWARD C. 
LUCK, UN SECURITY COUNCIL: PRACTICE AND PROMISE 14, 135 n.24 
(2006). 
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unanimous on decisions relating to the use of force under Chapter VII.10 
Of course, in 1945, the field of international justice basically did not 
yet exist.11 Accordingly, if one were to examine contemporaneous uses 
of the veto—for example, veto of a chemical weapons inspections regime 
in Syria,12 and veto of a ceasefire in Aleppo that would have allowed 
for provision of humanitarian assistance13—these kinds of topics were 
simply not discussed in 1945.  Keep in mind that in 1945, while there 
had been nascent attempts at what we now call the field of 
“international justice” and early developments regarding the concept of 
jus cogens,14 the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was just 
commencing its work and there was not yet the 1948 Genocide 
Convention15 nor the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.16 Thus, much of 
the law that we now have did not exist yet.   
Cold War Veto Use 
During the Cold War, there was extensive use of the veto, 
predominantly by the Soviet Union and the United States, related to 
each other’s spheres of influence.17 The General Assembly responded 
 
10. See Kirgis, supra note 5, at 512.  
11.  See History, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/history 
[https://perma.cc/P4LD-995K].  
12. See, e.g., S.C. Res. S/2017/970 (Nov. 17, 2017) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation); S.C. Res. S/2017/962 (Nov. 16, 2017) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation); S.C. Res. S/2017/884 (Oct. 27, 2017) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation).  
13. See S.C. Res. S/2016/1026 (Dec. 5, 2016) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation and China); see also U.N. SCOR, 71st Sess., 7825d mtg. at 2, 
U.N. Doc. S/PV.7825 (May 12, 2016).  
14. See generally Kamrul Hossain, The Concept of Jus cogens and the 
Obligation Under the U.N. Charter, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 72 (2005).  
15. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
16. See Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
Aug. 12 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention III Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva 
Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter, collectively, 1949 
Geneva Conventions]. 
17. Emma McClean, Hard Evidence: Who Uses Veto in the UN Security 
Council Most Often - and for What?, THE CONVERSATION (July 31, 2014 
1:03 PM), http://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-who-uses-veto-in-
the-un-security-council-most-often-and-for-what-
29907#:~:targetText=The%20use%20of%20the%20veto,600%20resolutio
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already in the late 1940s with a series of resolutions requesting the 
permanent member to show moderation in veto use18 because there was 
a genuine fear that extensive veto use would cause the Security Council 
(and, hence, the UN) to fall into the paralysis that had beset the League 
of Nations.19 
These concerns manifested in 1950 in the “Uniting for Peace” 
resolution, which created a procedure for an emergency special session 
of the General Assembly to be called to take up issues blocked at the 
Security Council.20 The United States led this approach as it was trying 
to obtain authorization for the Korean War.21 It was, of course, also 
then a differently composed General Assembly, sympathetic to the U.S. 
position.22 This process under the Uniting for Peace resolution, 
however, has only been utilized a handful of times,23 so is not seen as a 
full solution to paralysis caused by veto use. 
The General Assembly also has other residual powers under the UN 
Charter to address issues,24 so it can sometimes act in the face of 
Security Council paralysis,25 but not always. There are limits to the 
General Assembly’s competence. Certainly, anything that would 
 
ns%20between%201945%20%2D%201989 [https://perma.cc/FM3X-
MGSH]. 
18. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 40(I), ¶ 3 (Dec. 13, 1946); G.A. Res. 117(II), ¶ 3 
(Nov. 21, 1947); GA Res. 290(IV) (Dec. 1, 1949). 
19. See Jean Krasno & Mitushi Das, The Uniting for Peace Resolution and 
Other Ways of Circumventing the Authority of the Security Council, in 
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
AUTHORITY 177 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008) (“The failures of 
the League of Nations were still fresh in the minds of diplomats who did 
not want the newly created UN to be paralysed in the same way as the 
League had been.”).  
20. G.A. Res. 377(V), ¶¶ 1–2 (Nov. 30, 1950).  
21. David M. Malone, International Criminal Justice: Just an Expensive 
Mirage?, 63 INT’L J. 729, 733 (2008). 
22. Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations and The Korean War: A Case 
Study, 25 THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 90, 93 (1953). 
23. See Dominik Zaum, The Security Council, The General Assembly, and 
War: The Uniting for Peace Resolution, in THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND 
PRACTICE SINCE 1945, at 163 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008) 
(summarizing how the Uniting for Peace resolution has been utilized). 
24. See UN Charter arts. 10 and 11, ¶ 2.  
25. The recent creation of the IIIM to compile evidence of atrocity crimes in 
Syria is one such example. See G.A. Res. A/71/L.48 (Dec. 19, 2016). IIIM 
stands for “The International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to 
Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the 
Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian 
Arab Republic Since March 2011.” Id.   
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require a force authorization would fall beyond its competence;26 for 
example, this would include even “lesser” uses of force, such as 
authorizing a “no fly zone,” protecting civilians in internally displaced 
persons (“IDP”) camps, or creating humanitarian aid corridors. 
Post-Cold War 
In the 1990s, emerging from the Cold War, there existed a brief 
period of optimism that Russian and U.S. vetoes would no longer 
dominate and more could be accomplished at the Security Council.27 
During this time, sufficient political alignment existed to permit, for 
example, the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia28 and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda.29 Yet, that time-period was limited and dynamics now appear 
to have returned to something more resembling echoes of the Cold War 
in terms of Security Council voting patterns.30 
Veto Use or Threats While Atrocity Crimes Are 
Ongoing 
This article primarily discusses “veto use” in the face of atrocity 
crimes, but note that it is sometimes the threat of the veto that can act 
similarly, as a threat by a permanent member to use its veto can block 
the Security Council just as effectively as actual veto use.31A parallel 
problem exists where, due to a permanent member’s political alignment, 
it is simply understood that the permanent member would veto, so no 
resolution is ever drafted and nothing is ever put to a vote.32  This is 
even harder to detect; yet, it can operate just as effectively as an actual 
veto or a veto threat, because certain measures or language is 
 
26. See UN Charter Chapter VII, art. 42 (forceful measures). 
27. Joelle Hageboutros, The Evolving Role of the Security Council in the Post-
Cold War Period, 1 SWARTHMORE INT’L REL. J. 10, 10–11 (2016). 
28. See S.C. Res. S/1993/827 (May 25, 1993).  
29. See S.C. Res. S/1994/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
30. See generally Paul Romita, (Dis)unity in the Security Council: Voting 
Patterns in the UN’s Peace and Security Organ (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, City University of New York), available at 
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3689&cont
ext=gc_etds [https://perma.cc/7TUB-SZRW].  
31. See UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto, SECURITY COUNCIL 
REPORT (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-
security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php [https://perma.cc/V7X8-
4ULS]. 
32. See id. 
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presumptively “off the table.”33  In effect, the would-be-proponent(s) of 
the resolution and the Security Council member state charged with 
drafting, “the penholder,” self-censor themselves—not drafting a 
resolution known to have no chance of passing and/or not wishing to 
antagonize a particular permanent member.34 
In terms of veto use in the face of atrocity crimes, historically, going 
back to the apartheid era, there were French, U.K., and U.S. vetoes 
protecting the government in South Africa.35 This did not, however, 
result in complete Security Council paralysis, as there were measures 
that passed, including, eventually, mandatory sanctions.36  
In 1994, there was no express veto use, but it was known that the 
U.S. and France (and, by some accounts, also the U.K.) would have 
vetoed any resolution recognizing the killing in Rwanda as “genocide,” 
or sending in more robust peacekeeping forces near the start of the 
genocide.37 The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (“UNAMIR”),38 led 
by Canadian General Roméo Dallaire, was in Kigali with a minimal 
force and the wrong mandate in the middle of the genocide.39 States 
utilized awkward formulations regarding the crimes, such as saying 
“isolated acts of genocide may be occurring.”40 Such terminology is 
essentially meaningless, as either the dolus specialis of genocide is met 
 
33. See id.  
34.  Interview by Jennifer Trahan with Andras Vamos-Goldman, political 
coordinator and legal adviser to the Canadian Mission to the United 
Nations from 1997 to 2002 (June 3, 2019) (on file with author).  
35. See Jan Wouters & Tom Ruys, Security Council Reform: A New Veto for 
a New Century?, Egmont Paper No. 9, at 15 (Aug. 2005), available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/8980/1/ep9.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD3Y-379N]. See 
also S.C. Draft Res. S/12312/Rev.1 (Oct. 26, 1977) (explaining the 
question of South Africa (Apartheid); vetoed by the U.S., U.K., and 
France); S.C. Draft Res. S/12311/Rev.1 (Oct. 26, 1977) (explaining the 
question of South Africa, Apartheid, the South African Border War, and 
South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons program; vetoed by the U.S., U.K., and 
France);  S.C. Draft Res. S/12310/Rev.1 (Oct. 26, 1977) (explaining the 
question of South Africa (Apartheid and the South African Border War); 
vetoed by the U.S., U.K., and France).  
36.  See S.C. Res. S/1977/418 (Nov. 4, 1977).  
37. Ariela Blätter & Paul D. Williams, The Responsibility Not to Veto, 3 
GLOB. RESP. PROTECT 301, 311 (2011).  
38.  S.C. Res 872 (Oct. 5, 1993).  
39. See generally ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE 
FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004) (detailing a moving account of 
the Rwanda genocide).  
40. Douglas Jehl, Officials Told to Avoid Rwanda Killings ‘Genocide,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (June 10, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/10/world/officials-told-to-avoid-
calling-rwanda-killings-genocide.html [https://perma.cc/DSB6-7C22]. 
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or not.41 There was eventually a UN force deployment of UNAMIR II, 
but troops arrived only when the genocide was largely over,42 and the 
French-led “Opération Turquoise,” also had the effect of facilitating the 
escape of Hutu perpetrators into then Zaire.43  
The United States frequently uses the veto when Israel is at issue; 
sometimes these vetoes are in the face of atrocity crimes,44 sometimes 
not.45  The U.S. of course has well-known military, financial, and 
diplomatic ties to the state of Israel.46 
 
41. Dolus specialis refers to the special mental state requirement of genocide. 
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 498 
(Sept. 2, 1998) (“Genocide is distinct from other crimes insomuch as it 
embodies a special intent or dolus specialis.”).  
42. HOWARD ADELMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CONFLICT AND 
GENOCIDE: LESSONS FROM THE RWANDA EXPERIENCE 52 (David Millwood 
ed., 1996). 
43. Blätter & Williams, supra note 37, at 321 n.68.  
44. See Rodrigo Campos, U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution Denouncing Violence 
Against Palestinians, REUTERS (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestine-un-vote/u-s-vetoes-
u-n-resolution-denouncing-violence-against-palestinians-
idUSKCN1IX5UW [https://perma.cc/T57W-GT9P]. 
45. Colum Lynch, Rise of the Lilliputians, FOR. POL’Y (May 10, 2012, 9:49 
PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/10/rise-of-the-lilliputians 
[https://perma.cc/GVW9-SSCQ] (“The United States . . . has routinely 
used its veto power to shield Israel from Security Council measures 
demanding it show greater restraint in its dealings with the 
Palestinians.”). See also Citizen for Global Solutions, The Responsibility 
Not to Veto: A Way Forward, CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, at 4 
(2014) (suggesting that not all U.S. vetoes have been used in the face of 
atrocity crimes, and suggesting some vetoes may have been warranted 
due to “language [that] can be interpreted as unbalanced and aggressive”); 
UN Security Council, US Vetoes of Resolutions Critical to Israel (1972–
Present), JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/u-s-vetoes-of-un-security-council-
resolutions-critical-to-israel [https://perma.cc/4SD4-9AJX] (one analysis 
of vetoes related to Israel).  
46. See Stephen Zunes, Why the U.S. Supports Israel, INST. POL’Y STUD. 
(May 1, 2002), https://ips-dc.org/why_the_us_supports_israel 
[https://perma.cc/B7FT-CFC5]; see generally Charles D. Freilich, Can 
Israel Survive Without America?, 59 SURVIVAL 135 (2017).  
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China appears generally to prefer not to expressly use its veto,47 
and it is more the veto threat that is at work.48 One sees this manifested 
in the minimal Security Council response during the Darfur genocide, 
with a UN-African Union (“AU”) hybrid peacekeeping operation 
(“UNAMID”),49 very gradually deployed with the consent of the 
government of Sudan long after the height of the killing was over. Veto 
threats also weakened the sanctions regime, including eliminating any 
oil embargo, and weakening, initially, the arms embargo.50  While 
former President Bashir of Sudan stands charged with genocide 
committed in Darfur,51 the current arguments also apply even if the 
crimes are recognized as crimes against humanity and war crimes.52 Of 
 
47. An exception would be regarding a resolution related to Taiwan or a 
country that has relations with Taiwan, where China would use, and has 
used, an express veto. See, e.g., Patrick E. Tyler, China Asserts Taiwan’s 
Ties To Guatemala Led to Veto, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 1997), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/12/world/china-asserts-taiwan-s-
ties-to-guatemala-led-to-veto.html [https://perma.cc/G7FS-Y5FL] 
(vetoing peacekeeping deployment to Guatemala in 1997 because of its 
relationship with Taiwan); Nicole Winfield, China Vetoes, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Feb. 25, 1999), 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/190/33325.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/8S3Q-Q2DU] (vetoing peacekeeping deployment 
regarding Macedonia in 1999).  
48. See UN Extends Afghan Mission After China Veto Threat, RADIO FREE 
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.rferl.org/a/un-
extends-afghan-mission-after-china-veto-threat/30169944.html 
[https://perma.cc/2ZBD-QH45]. 
49. UNAMID took over from AU forces on December 31, 2007. See S.C. Res. 
S/2007/1769 (July 31, 2007). 
50. See generally id.; Head of Sudan Sanctions Committee Briefs Security 
Council as Delegates Debate Criteria for Lifting 13-Year-Old Measures, 
Ongoing Sexual Violence, UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13668.doc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GS56-FNAA].  
51. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 
Judgment, ¶ 12 (May 6, 2019), available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02593.PDF [https://perma.cc/CQ5S-
P4L3] (charging former President Bashir with genocide). See also Jennifer 
Trahan, Why the Killing in Darfur Is Genocide, 31 FORDHAM J. INT’L L. 
990 (2007).  
52. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, ¶ 12 
(July 12, 2010). There are also outstanding arrest warrants against 
Ahmad Muhammad Harun, then Sudan’s Minister of State for the 
Interior, and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), one 
of the most senior Janjaweed commanders. Prosecutor v. Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-
Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), ICC-02/05-01/07 (Apr. 27, 2007), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/harunkushayb [https://perma.cc/UZ9W-
NUUW]. In 2012, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) issued an 
additional arrest warrant for Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, Sudan’s 
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course, China has been strategically aligned with the Sudanese 
administration through significant economic ties, including Sudanese oil 
exports to China, and Sudanese arms imports from China.53 
As to Sri Lanka, again one sees very little responsiveness out of the 
Security Council during the mass atrocity crimes of the civil war,54 and 
that pattern is repeated related to crimes against the Rohingya in 
Myanmar.55 There was one resolution expressly vetoed by China and 
Russia, already in 2007, related to Myanmar that would have 
condemned the crimes being committed early on in the conflict.56 It 
would have called on the Government of Myanmar to cease military 
attacks against civilians in ethnic minority regions and in particular to 
put an end to the associated human rights and humanitarian law 
violations against persons belonging to ethnic nationalities, including 
widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence carried out by 
members of the armed forces.57 
As with Sri Lanka, it is difficult to determine the exact number of 
veto threats by China related to Myanmar.58 It appears China’s support 
 
Minister of National Defense, for activities while he was Minister of the 
Interior.  Prosecutor v. Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, ICC-02/05-
01/12 (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/hussein 
[https://perma.cc/ZY76-BLKH].  
53. See Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 456–58 (2003), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/sudanprint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VUE2-L6MX]; Phillip Manyok, Oil and Darfur’s 
Blood: China’s Thirst for Sudan’s Oil, 4 J. POL. SCI. & PUB. AFF. (2016), 
https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/oil-and-darfurs-blood-chinas-
thirst-for-sudans-oil-2332-0761-1000189.php?aid=69390 
[https://perma.cc/ZM77-JBLM]; Eric Reeves, Partners in Genocide: A 
Comprehensive Guide to China’s Role in Darfur (Dec. 19, 2007), 
http://sudanreeves.org/2007/12/19/partners-in-genocide-a-
comprehensive-guide-to-chinas-role-in-darfur [https://perma.cc/WM6Y-
UYQZ].  
54. Crisis in Sri Lanka, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-sri-
lanka [https://perma.cc/CE7S-KPFY]. 
55. Colum Lynch, For Years, U.N. Was Warned of Threat to Rohingya in 
Myanmar, FOR. POL’Y (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/16/for-years-u-n-was-warned-of-
threat-to-rohingya-in-myanmar/ [https://perma.cc/M4F8-7BWF].  
56. See Security Council - Veto List, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, 
https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick [https://perma.cc/3AGW-
HFS7].  
57. S.C. Res. S/2007/14, at 2 (Jan. 12, 2007) (vetoed by China and the 
Russian Federation). 
58. See generally Michelle Nichols, China Fails to Stop U.N. Security Council 
Myanmar Briefing, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/china-fails-
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for Myanmar has simply translated into a consistent understanding 
that China would not support significant Security Council involvement.  
Most recently, it is the situation in Syria that has attracted the 
most attention with fourteen Russian vetoes (and eight accompanying 
Chines vetoes): 
• On October 4, 2011, Russia and China vetoed a 
resolution that would have demanded an end to use of 
force by the Syrian authorities, calling for an end to 
violence and human rights violations;59 
• On February 4, 2012, Russian and China vetoed 
condemnation of “continued widespread and gross 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by 
the Syrian authorities, such as the use of force against 
civilians, arbitrary executions, killing and persecution of 
protestors and members of the media, arbitrary 
detention, enforced disappearances, interference with 
access to medical treatment, torture, sexual violence, and 
ill-treatment, including against children”;60 
• On July 19, 2012, Russia and China vetoed 
condemnation of bombing and shelling of population 
centers, and condemnation of detention of thousands in 
government-run facilities;61 
• On May 22, 2014, Russia and China vetoed referral of 
the situation in Syria to the ICC;62 
• On October 8, 2016, Russia vetoed a resolution 
expressing outrage at the alarming number of civilian 
casualties, including those caused by indiscriminate 
aerial bombardment in Aleppo;63 
 
to-stop-un-security-council-myanmar-briefing-idUSKCN1MY2QU 
[https://perma.cc/TP6X-DZHV].  
59. S.C. Res. S/2011/612, 1–2 (Oct. 4, 2011) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation and China).  
60. S.C. Res. S/2012/77, ¶ 1 (Feb. 4, 2012) (vetoed by the Russian Federation 
and China). 
61. S.C. Res. S/2012/538, pmbl. (July 19, 2012) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation and China).  
62. S.C. Res. S/2014/348, pmbl. (May 22, 2014) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation and China).  
63. S.C. Res. S/2016/846, pmbl. (Oct. 6, 2016) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation). 
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• On December 5, 2016, Russia and China vetoed a 7-day 
ceasefire in Aleppo that would have allowed 
humanitarian assistance;64 
• On February 28, 2017, Russia and China vetoed 
condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and a 
demand for compliance with the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (“OPCW”);65 
• On April 12, 2017, Russia vetoed a request for 
documentation such as flight plans and access to air 
bases from which chemical weapons were believed to 
have been launched;66 
• October 24, 2017, Russia vetoed renewal of the UN Joint 
Investigative Mechanism (“JIM”)—a chemical weapons 
inspection regime that would have attributed  
responsibility to the side using the weapons;67  
• On November 16, 2017, Russia vetoed a resolution that 
would have condemned the use of toxic chemicals as 
weapons, expressed grave concern that civilians continue 
to be killed and injured by such weapons, renewed the 
mandate of the JIM, and stated that “no party in Syria 
shall use, develop produce otherwise acquire, stockpile or 
retain, or transfer chemical weapons”;68  
• On November 17, 2017 Russia again vetoed renewal of 
the JIM;69  
• On April 10, 2018, Russia vetoed condemnation of “use 
of any toxic chemical including chlorine as a weapon in 
the Syrian Arab Republic,” and an expression of outrage 
“that civilians continue to be killed and injured by 
 
64. S.C. Res. S/2016/1026, ¶ 10 (Dec. 5, 2016) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation and China). 
65. S.C. Res. S/2017/172, pmbl. (Feb. 28, 2017) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation and China). 
66. S.C. Res. S/2017/315, ¶ 5 (Apr. 12, 2017) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation). 
67. S.C. Res. S/2017/884, ¶ 1 (Oct. 27, 2017) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation). The JIM was originally created by Security Council 
Resolution S/2015/2235, on August 7, 2015, with its mandate renewed 
twice in 2016.  
68. S.C. Res. S/2017/962, pmbl., ¶¶ 1, 3 (Nov. 16, 2017) (vetoed by the 
Russian Federation). 
69. S.C. Res. S/2017/970, ¶ 1 (Nov. 17, 2017) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation). 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Questioning Unlimited Veto Use in the Face of Atrocity Crimes 
84 
chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons in the 
Syrian Arab Republic”;70  
• On September 19, 2019, Russia and China vetoed a 
resolution that would have implemented a ceasefire for 
Syria’s war-torn Idlib province, called for a halt to a 
campaign of indiscriminate aerial bombardment 
occurring there, and demanded humanitarian access and 
safe passage for medical personnel;71 and  
• On December 20, 2019, Russia and China vetoed a 
resolution that would have called for improved 
humanitarian assistance, reiterated the obligation to 
comply with international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law, and called for “safe, 
unimpeded and sustained access” for humanitarian 
convoys.72 
There has also recently been at least one veto related to Yemen, of 
draft Resolution S/2018/156, regarding sanctions, vetoed by Russia due 
to a reference to a Yemen Panel of Experts’ finding that Iran was in 
non-compliance with the arms embargo that had been imposed.73   
 
70. S.C. Res. S/2018/321, ¶ 1 (Apr. 10, 2018) (vetoed by the Russian 
Federation). The resolution also would have established the UN 
Independent Mechanism of Investigation (“UNIMI”) “to identify to the 
greatest extent feasible, individuals, entities, groups, or governments who 
were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of 
chemical weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the 
Syrian Arab Republic.” Id., ¶ 8.  
71. S/2019/756 (vetoed by the Russian Federation and China). 
72. S/2019/961 (vetoed by the Russian Federation and China). 
73. Chronology of Events, Yemen, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/yemen.php 
[https://perma.cc/3KLA-ZUXU]; Rick Gladstone, Russia Vetoes U.N. 
Resolution to Pressure Iran Over Yemen Missiles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/middleeast/iran-
yemen-security-council.html [https://perma.cc/7ZLB-UNK6]  (“Russia 
blocked a resolution at the United Nations Security Council on Monday 
that would have pressured Iran over the illegal use of Iranian-made 
missiles by Houthi insurgents in Yemen.”). There are also reports of a 
veto threat by the U.S., stalling a U.K.-drafted resolution until it dropped 
language on the need for accountability for war crimes and guaranteeing 
humanitarian deliveries. Julian Borger, UN Agrees Yemen Ceasefire 
Resolution After Fraught Talks and US Veto Threat, THE GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/21/un-
yemen-ceasfire-stockholm-resolution-us [https://perma.cc/T3RY-
VK6J].  Another source mentions U.S., U.K., and French veto threats to 
quash attempts at restraining the Saudi-led coalition or implicating its 
members in war crimes. Category: Yemen at the UN, SANA’A CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC STUDIES (Aug. 5, 2018), 
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Were these kinds of vetoes—blocking chemical weapons inspections 
or blocking humanitarian assistance during a siege—envisioned during 
the Charter negotiations?  No, there simply was no discussion of vetoing 
such measures.  
While it is not claimed that veto use caused all the fatalities in any 
of the situations discussed, there certainly is a linkage between vetoes 
being cast (or veto threats made)—an action by one or more of the 
permanent members—and fatalities on the ground, even if one cannot 
necessarily link particular vetoes to particular fatalities.  
Notwithstanding, it is safe to say that current veto use in the face of 
atrocity crimes is costing lives.74 
These vetoes and veto threats also arguably conveyed to the 
governments at issue that they would be protected from scrutiny and 
accountability.75  They also undermined the potential for deterrence 
that otherwise potentially could have been created as the vetoes 
provided the governments at issue with a sense of invincibility—that 
they had a certain measure of “protection” from scrutiny, the 
imposition of responding measures (such as sanctions), and/or 
accountability.76 
Voluntary Veto Restraint Initiatives 
Consternation at unrestrained veto use has existed for a while, 
commencing, as mentioned, with early Cold War General Assembly 
 
http://sanaacenter.org/category/publications/yemen-at-the-un 
[https://perma.cc/VC96-B7PD].  
74. One example is that after creation of an OPCW Fact-Finding Mission 
(“OPCW-FFM”) through at least the early work of the JIM, there is a 
nearly two-year gap in chemical weapons attacks in Syria documented by 
the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. See 
Chemical Weapons Attacks Document by the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, OHCHR (Jan. 15, 
2018), 
https://www.ohchr.org/SiteCollectionImages/Bodies/HRCouncil/IICISy
ria/COISyria_ChemicalWeapons.jpg [https://perma.cc/RP96-9NSQ] 
(listing no chemical weapons attacks between April 2014 and April 2016) 
[hereinafter Chemical Weapons Attacks]. In fact, a draft Security Council 
resolution mentioned that “immediately after the JIM’s establishment 
there was a decrease in the number of allegations of use of chemicals as 
weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.” See S.C. Res. S/2017/172 (Feb. 
28, 2017) (vetoed by the Russian Federation and China).  
75. This Is How Putin Kneecapped the UN Security Council, POLITICS.CO.UK 
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.politics.co.uk/comment-
analysis/2018/04/20/this-is-how-putin-kneecapped-the-un-security-
council [https://perma.cc/QHV4-J4EN]. 
76. See generally id.  
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resolutions seeking veto restraint.77  More recently, attention has shifted 
particularly to veto use while there are ongoing atrocity crimes 
(genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes).78  Over the 
last nearly twenty years, states and civil society actors have 
increasingly called for voluntary veto restraint in the face of such 
crimes.79  
The Responsibility Not to Veto 
Commencing in 2001 with the report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which first 
articulated the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect” (“R2P”), one 
sees a call for veto restraint.80 Of course, the agenda of R2P can be all 
too easily blocked by veto use.81  Various later R2P reports contain 
similar calls for veto restraint in the face of atrocity crimes.82 
The “S5” Initiative  
Chronologically, there was next an initiative out of the “S5” 
(“Small 5”) group of states (Costa Rica, Jordan, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and Liechtenstein) calling for veto restraint in the face of 
atrocity crimes as well as other measures to encourage Security Council 
transparency.83 It was presented in a draft General Assembly resolution 
 
77. See G.A. Res. 40(I) (Dec. 13, 1946); G.A. Res. 117(II) (Nov. 21, 1947); 
GA Res. 290(IV) (Dec. 1, 1949).  
78. While “ethnic cleansing” is sometimes included in this context, that term 
has no defined meaning under international criminal law, so is not used 
by the author.  See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court arts. 6–8, July 18, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (as amended) 
(defining genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes). 
79. UN Security Council Code of Conduct, GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://www.globalr2p.org/our_work/un_security_council_code_of_co
nduct [https://perma.cc/85FR-PLHV] [hereinafter GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT]. 
80. The Responsibility to Protect, INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY, xiii (2001).  
81. UN Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect: Voluntary 
Restraint of the Veto in Situations of Mass Atrocity, UNITED NATIONS 
ASS’N-UK, https://www.una.org.uk/sites/default/files/Briefing%20-
%20Veto%20code%20of%20conduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM5W-
AMBV].  
82. See, e.g., Rep. of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change: A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, ¶ 256, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004); Rep. of the 
Secretary-General: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 61, 
U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).  
83. See Letter Dated November 3, 2005, from Costa Rica, Jordan, 
Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland, (Nov. 3, 2005), available at 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Questioning Unlimited Veto Use in the Face of Atrocity Crimes 
87 
in 2006,84 but no action was taken. The initiative then resurfaced in a 
2012 draft resolution calling for veto restraint and other measures 
encouraging Security Council transparency.85 After pressure reportedly 
was exerted on the Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs,86 she 
declared the resolution pertained to an “important question,” and under 
Article 18(2) of the UN Charter required a two-thirds General 
Assembly vote, rather than a majority vote.87 In the face of that 
decision, as well as apparent pressure by permanent members for other 
states not to support the resolution,88 the S5 resolution was 
withdrawn.89  Switzerland’s then-Permanent Representative, H.E. Mr. 
Paul Seger, in his speech withdrawing the resolution, somewhat 
prophetically stated “[t]his is not the closing of a chapter, but the 
opening of a new one.”90   
The French/Mexican Initiative 
Encouragingly, a call for veto restraint was also taken up by a 
permanent member of the Security Council—France.91 At one point, as 
part of various proposals for UN Security Council reform, one idea 
floated was giving away France’s seat on the Security Council to 
 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Swiss_S5_Resolution_Nove
mber_10_2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ5Y-WC7M] (suggesting a draft 
General Assembly resolution).  
84. Id. 
85. Draft Resolution, Enhancing the Accountability, Transparency and 
Effectiveness of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/66/L.42/Rev.2 (May 
15, 2012), available at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a%2066%20l42%20rev2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/848J-CKUF]. 
86. Volker Lehmann, Reforming the Working Methods of the UN Security 
Council: The Next Act, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG, 3 (Aug. 2013), 
available at https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/10180.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P3UJ-7VJ6].  
87. Legal Opinion of Patricia O’Brien Under-Secretary-General for 
Legal Affairs (May 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.innercitypress.com/OLA2PGAs5May.pdf. 
88. Lehmann, supra note 86, at 3.   
89. Id.  
90. Statement by H.E. Mr. Paul Seger, Permanent Representative, 
Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN, Follow-Up to the Outcome 
of the Millennium Summit, G.A. 66th Sess., at 7 (May 16, 2012), available 
at https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/mission-new-
york/en/documents/2012-05-16_Millenium_Summit_S5_Statement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MM5M-5R57].  
91.  GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 79.  
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become a rotating European Union seat.92  Possibly, France saw its seat 
as a permanent member as being less than fully secure, and, therefore, 
saw more of a need to be seen as a responsible member of the Council 
in its voting. 
France proposed a political declaration, which became known as 
the “French/Mexican initiative,” calling for veto restraint in the face 
of atrocity crimes.93 Currently 105 states have endorsed this approach.94 
Yet, it contains a carve-out that the veto can be used in a permanent 
member’s “vital national interests.”95 That begs the question of whether 
the permanent member would be the sole judge of its “vital national 
interests.” Furthermore, why should there be any “vital national 
interests” that align with the perpetration of atrocity crimes? 
The ACT Code of Conduct 
A fourth voluntary veto restraint initiative is the ACT Group of 
States’ “Code of Conduct.”96 (ACT stands for “Accountability, 
Coherence and Transparency.”) Interestingly, it was France that first 
articulated the need for a code of conduct, but it was the S5 group 
(minus Singapore), that then advocated for the Code of Conduct, which 
launched in May 2013 with twenty-two states then supporting it.97  
The Code of Conduct is not simply limited to veto restraint in the 
face of atrocity crimes, but more broadly calls for states to support 
timely and decisive Security Council action in the face of atrocity crimes 
 
92. For proposals to change the membership of the Security Council, see 
Global Policy Forum, Background on Security Council Reform, 
Membership Including Expansion and Representation, 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-
reform/membership-including-expansion-and-
representation.html [https://perma.cc/ZJH9-ZTF9].  
93. For background on the “French/Mexican initiative,” see Jean-Baptise 
Jeangène Vilmer, The Responsibility Not to Veto: A Genealogy, 24 GLOB. 
GOVERNANCE, 1, 6 (2018), available at 
https://www.fesny.org/fileadmin/user_upload/The_Responsibility_Not
_to_Veto_-_web_version.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PWM-KM2A].  
94. Center for Global Affairs Examines Security Council Veto Reform, NYU 
(May 20, 2019), 
https://www.sps.nyu.edu/homepage/academics/divisions-and-
departments/center-for-global-affairs/highlights/2019/center-for-global-
affairs-examines-security-council-veto-reform.html (updated by Trahan 
email exchange with the Legal Adviser of the Permanent Mission of 
Mexico to the UN).   
95. Vilmer, supra note 93, at 6. 
96. Permanent Rep. of Lichtenstein to the U.N., Letter Dated December 14, 
2015 from the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United 
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/70/621–
S/2015/978, annex I (Dec. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Code of Conduct].   
97. Lehmann, supra note 86, at 2.    
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and not vote against a “credible draft resolution” before the Security 
Council to end the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
or war crimes, or to prevent such crimes.98 It is currently signed by 121 
states—including the United Kingdom and France.99 Thus, there are 
actually two permanent member states endorsing veto restraint in the 
face of atrocity crimes. 
Yet, the carve-out in the Code of Conduct (apparently drafted at 
U.K. insistence) that the call for veto restraint would only apply to the 
veto of a “credible draft” Security Council resolution begs the question, 
what constitutes a “credible draft resolution,” leaving an opening for a 
permanent member to declare a resolution not a “credible draft” and 
use the veto anyway. 
There have also been a number of other voluntary veto restraint 
initiatives. One was proposed by a group of elder statespersons known 
as the “Elders,” which included Kofi Annan and Nelson Mandela.100 
Former Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs at the UN Hans 
Corell had his own veto restraint initiative.101 There was even a U.S.-
based Genocide Prevention Task Force chaired by former U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and U.S. Senator William S. 
Cohen that called for veto restraint.102  The U.S. Task Force during the 
 
98. Code of Conduct, supra note 96, annex I, ¶ 2.  
99. See List of Supporters of the Code of Conduct Regarding Security Council 
Action Against Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity or War Crimes, as 
Elaborated by ACT, PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF 
LIECHTENSTEIN (Jan. 1, 2019), 
https://www.regierung.li/media/medienarchiv/2020-1-
1_CoC_List_of_supporters.pdf [hereinafter List of Supporters of the 
Code of Conduct].  
100. The Elders Call for Strengthening of the United Nations: Fit for Purpose 
in the 21st Century, THE ELDERS (Feb. 7, 2015), 
https://theelders.org/sites/default/files/2015_02-press-release-the-
elders-call-for-the-strengthening-of-the-united-nations_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RJB3-3GPW].   
101. Letter Dated Dec. 10, 2008 from Former U.N. Legal Counsel Hans Corell 
to the Governments of the Members of the United Nations (Dec. 10, 
2008), available at 
http://www.havc.se/res/SelectedMaterial/20081210corelllettertounmem
bers.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR28-DNLM] (advancing the idea that when 
it comes to Security Council reform, the rule of law is more important 
than additional members).  
102. Madeleine K. Albright & William S. Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A 
Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers, U.S. GENOCIDE PREVENTION TASK 
FORCE, at 106–07 (Dec. 8, 2008), available at 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/files/genocide_taskforce_repor
t.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H49-YBHV].   
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Questioning Unlimited Veto Use in the Face of Atrocity Crimes 
90 
Obama Administration did not result in the United States joining either 
the Code of Conduct or the French/Mexican initiative.103 
Some of the variations in these veto restraint initiatives include: 
which crimes are covered; whether a threat of the veto should be 
covered; whether the threat of the crimes would be covered (or the 
crimes must be occurring); whether there should be an outside body 
that serves as a “trigger” to recognize that the crimes are occurring; 
whether there should be an explanation by a permanent member using 
the veto, including how the veto is consistent with international law; 
whether there should be a carve-out permitting the veto in a permanent 
member’s “vital national interests”; and whether all vetoes of 
resolutions in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or 
war crimes should be covered, or veto restraint should only apply, for 
example, where there is a “credible draft resolution.”104 
On the positive side, these initiatives reflect nearly twenty years of 
momentum that something must be done about unrestrained veto use 
while there are ongoing atrocity crimes (genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and/or war crimes), and two permanent members share this 
position.105 On the negative side, these initiatives are seen as “soft 
law”106—a code of conduct and a political declaration—so they do not 
purport to articulate binding legal obligations, and, perhaps more 
significantly, three permanent members have joined none of them.107 
Thus, in the end, while these initiatives are extremely helpful in 
increasing the political “cost” of veto use, they are not reining in veto 
use, even in the face of mass atrocities. 
Examining Existing Legal Limits to Veto Use in the 
Face of Atrocity Crimes 
In light of continuous use of the veto and its threat in situations of 
atrocity crimes—despite continued condemnation of such practices and 
widespread calls for veto restraint—the time is ripe for taking a fresh 
 
103.  See generally List of Supporters of the Code of Conduct, supra note 99; 
Vilmer, supra note 93, at 9.  
104. These variations in approach will be examined in my forthcoming book.  
See TRAHAN, supra note 2, Chapter 3.  
105. See generally Press Release, General Assembly, Member States Call for 
Removing Veto Power, Expanding Security Council to Include New 
Permanent Seats, as General Assembly Debates Reform Plans for 15-
Member Organ, U.N. Press Release GA/12091 (Nov. 20, 2019). 
106. See, e.g., Theresa Reinold, The “Responsibility Not to Veto,” Secondary 
Rules, and the Rule of Law, 6 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT  269, 276 (2014) 
(referring to the responsibility not to veto as a soft secondary rule in the 
form of a non-binding code of conduct).  
107. See generally Dinah L. Shelton, Soft Law, in HANDBOOK OF INT’L L. 1–22 
(Routledge Press, 2008) (defining “soft law”).  
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look at this situation and to consider whether international law has 
anything to say about unrestrained veto use in the face of atrocity 
crimes.  Certainly, in 1945, there was not yet as much international law 
as exists today, but, by now, it is clear that the veto power (conferred 
by the UN Charter)108 sits within the context of a system of 
international law. Whereas the veto sometimes appears to be treated 
as a carte blanche (a permanent member may veto for whatever reason 
or no reason),109 the veto, created in the UN Charter, actually sits 
within a system of international law. 
Three main legal arguments indicate there are legal limits, or 
constraints, on the use of the veto in the face of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and/or war crimes based on existing international law.110  
(These arguments are detailed far more extensively in my book.)111    
The Veto and Jus Cogens 
First, is whether current veto use is consistent with genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes being recognized as jus cogens 
 
108. While the word “veto” is not contained in the UN Charter, the veto power 
is created under Article 27(3). See U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3. The 
requirement of concurring votes means that a negative vote (i.e., veto) 
cannot be cast. See id.  
109. WOUTERS & RUYS, supra note 35, at 9 (“States often fail to provide 
clarification of their exact motives for casting a vote. Even when States 
do give a public explanation, this will not necessarily correspond to the 
real reason.”). Liechtenstein recently announced a new initiative that 
there should be mandatory discussion in a formal meeting of the General 
Assembly every time the veto is used within the Security Council. See 
Meetings Coverage, U.N. GAOR, 73d Sess., 106th mtg., General Assembly 
Adopts 5 Resolutions, Including Texts on Revitalizing Its Own Work, 
Designating 2021 ‘International Year of Peace and Trust,’ U.N. Doc. 
GA/12174 (Sept. 14, 2019), available at 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12174.doc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6EZ2-ZFA2]. 
110. See generally, e.g., Hannah Yiu, Jus Cogens, the Veto and the 
Responsibility to Protect: A New Perspective, 7 N.Z. Y.B. INT’L L. 207–
53 (2009). 
111. See TRAHAN, supra note 2. 
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norms.112 Jus cogens norms are, hierarchically, the highest level of law113 
from which no derogations are permitted114 which “cannot be 
violated,”115 which must be respected “in all circumstances,”116 and 
which “rules are absolute.”117 Because the veto power is conferred by 
the UN Charter, it is subordinate to jus cogens in terms of the hierarchy 
of norms.118 
 
112. ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, Commentary on arts. 40, 26, G.A. 
Res. 56/83 (adopted) (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles] (recognizing 
the existence of, inter alia, genocide and crimes against humanity as jus 
cogens norms). As to war crimes, the ILC writes: “In the light of the 
description by the ICJ of the basic rules of international humanitarian 
law applicable in armed conflict as ‘intransgressible’ in character, it would 
. . . seem justified to treat these as peremptory.” Id. (emphasis added) 
(citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 257 (July 8, 1996)).   
113. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation 
Erga Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (1996) (“[A] jus cogens norm 
holds the highest hierarchical position among all other norms and 
principles.”). See also André da Rocha Ferreira et al., Formation and 
Evidence of Customary International Law, 1 UFRGS MODEL U.N. J. 182, 
194 (2013) (“Peremptory norms of international law or norms of jus 
cogens have a superior hierarchy in relation to other rules.”).  
114. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 8 
I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining a peremptory norm as a norm of 
general international law “accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole . . . from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character”).  
115. JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 71 (Cambridge Studies in Int’l and Comp. L. Ser. No. 56, 2007).  
116. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, with a 
Projected List, 7 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 609, 610 (1977).  
117. Id. at 612.  
118. See R. NIETO-NAVIA, INTERNATIONAL PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) 
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 5 (2003). See also JAMES 
CRAWFORD, “CHANCE, ORDER, CHANGE:  THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW” GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (2013) (“It 
seems intuitively right that the Security Council should be bound by 
peremptory norms. They are by definition norms that cannot be derogated 
from except by subsequent norms of the same kind.”); SIMON 
CHESTERMAN, THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE RULE OF LAW: THE 
ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN STRENGTHENING A RULES-BASED 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 10–11, 19 (2008) (“It is generally acknowledged 
that the Security Council’s powers are subject to the UN Charter and 
norms of jus cogens . . . . The Council does not operate free of legal 
constraint. In strict legal terms this means that the Council’s powers are 
exercised subject to the Charter and norms of jus cogens.”).  
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Then, is it acceptable to veto in the face of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and/or war crimes119 considering these are jus cogens norms 
(receiving this highest level of protection)?  In the Tadić case, the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) held that the Security Council’s “powers cannot 
. . . go beyond the limits of the [UN].”120 The European Court of First 
Instance has held that jus cogens constitutes “a body of higher rules of 
public international law binding on all subjects of international law, 
including the bodies of the United Nations.”121 If the UN cannot violate 
jus cogens—as it cannot—then the Security Council, an organ of the 
UN, also cannot violate jus cogens.122  Permanent members are also 
 
119. My forthcoming book will examine whether all war crimes have risen to 
the level of jus cogens, or which ones have risen to that level.  See 
TRAHAN, supra note 2, ch. 4.1.  
120. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 28 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).  
121. See, e.g., Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-
03649; Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-03533; Joined Cases C-402/05 P & 
C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. 
Council and Comm’n, 47 I.L.M. 923, ¶ 287 (Sept. 3, 2008).  On appeal, 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (now known as the 
Court of Justice of the European Union) saw it somewhat differently, that 
its review should focus on how Community members implement Security 
Council resolutions. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and 
Commission, 47 ILM 923, para. 287 (Eur. Ct. Just. Sept. 3, 2008). 
122. Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), Request for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J., 9, 160 (Apr. 14) (dissenting opinion by 
Weeremantry, J.) (“The history of the United Nations Charter . . . 
corroborates the view that a clear limitation on the plenitude of the 
Security Council’s powers is that those powers must be exercised in 
accordance with the well-established principles of international law.”); 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 115 (June 21) 
(dissenting opinion by Fitzmaurice, J.) (“[T]he Security Council is as 
much subject to [international law] . . . as any of its individual member 
States are, [just as] the United Nations is itself a subject of international 
law . . . .”).  
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bound to respect jus cogens by the fact that states are bound to respect 
jus cogens123 and the permanent members are states.124 
Is it therefore acceptable to use the veto in a way that is 
inconsistent with, or, in the circumstances, facilitates (even if 
indirectly) the ongoing commission of crimes prohibited by, jus cogens? 
For example, is it acceptable to veto chemical weapons inspections 
when chemical weapons use is a war crimes (and, depending on context, 
a crime against humanity or means to commit genocide)?125 Assume 
such chemical weapons inspections were deterring chemical weapons 
attacks (which they were in Syria), but after the veto of the inspections 
regime, which was attributing responsibility to the side using the 
weapons, chemical weapons attacks increased. Therefore, there is a 
correlation between veto use and increased chemical weapons attacks.126  
The actions of the permanent members (including veto use):  (a) must 
not be used in circumstances such that their effect is to facilitate (even 
if indirectly) jus cogens violations,127 (b) must not undermine the duty 
of other Security Council members to cooperate to make an appropriate 
 
123. Salahuddin Mahmud & Shafiqur Rahman, The Concept and Status of Jus 
Cogens: An Overview, 3 INT’L J. L. 111 (2017) (“According to Oxford 
Dictionary of Law, jus cogens refers to a rule or principle in international 
law that is so fundamental that it binds all states and does not allow any 
exception.’ Thus the concept of jus cogens in the context of international 
law indicates that it is a body of fundamental legal principle which is 
binding upon all members of the international community in all 
circumstances.”) (emphasis added to last sentence).  
124. Security Council Report, UN Members – Security Council, 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-members-security-council 
[perma.cc/8UKK-LTTK]. 
125. See, e.g., Jennifer Trahan, A Critical Guide to the Iraqi High Tribunal’s 
Anfal Judgment: Genocide Against the Kurds, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 305 
(2009) (analyzing the “Anfal trial,” including the Iraqi Government’s 
campaign, including chemical weapons use, against the Kurds, 
adjudicated to constitute genocide). 
126. Chemical Weapons Attacks, supra note 74 (noting a decrease in chemical 
weapons attacks after the OPCW-FFM was created and during the early 
work of the JIM). 
127. See Yiu, supra note 110, at 232 (“Where there is a [core crime] situation 
involving the breach of a jus cogens norm, the veto cannot be used in a 
manner that facilitates this breach because such usage would be a 
violation of a non-derogable norm of international law.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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response to a serious breach of a jus cogens norm,128 and (c) must be 
consistent with jus cogens.129   
The Veto and the UN Charter 
Second, the veto power is created by the UN Charter.130 Yet, the 
UN Charter provides a limitation on the Security Council’s power. 
Under Article 24(2), the Security Council must act “in accordance with 
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”131 The “Purposes 
and Principles” of the United Nations in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter 
are quite broad, but they include respecting “principles of justice and 
international law,” “promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights,” “co-operation in solving international problems of [a] . . . 
humanitarian character,” and “good faith.”132 One might then ask 
whether the vetoes that are occurring are consistent with the UN’s 
“Purposes and Principles,”133 because if they are not, then the vetoing 
permanent member is acting ultra vires—that is, beyond the proper 
exercise of Security Council power.134 It appears quite clear that current 
veto use is inconsistent with the UN’s “Purposes and Principles.” 
Vetoes that are not in accordance with the UN’s “Purposes and 
Principles” would be beyond the competence of the permanent member.  
The Charter cannot have granted permanent member states the power 
to violate the UN’s “Purposes and Principles,” as the capacity of being 
 
128. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 112, Commentary on arts. 40–41 
(recognizing a duty of states to cooperate to bring to an end through 
lawful means any serious breach of an obligation arising under a 
peremptory norm of general international law). 
129. This argument as to the need for consistency is derived from jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights and European Court of Justice 
when the courts were trying to construe obligations created under 
Security Council resolutions in light of obligations created under the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and adopted a “harmonious interpretation” 
approach, whereby the presumption was that Security Council resolutions 
should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with Convention 
obligations. See, e.g., Secil Bilgic, Harmonious Interpretation Meets the 
UN Charter:  The Derogation Presumption, HARV. HUM. RTS. J. (2016), 
available at http://harvardhrj.com/harmonious-interpretation-meets-the-
un-charter-the-derogation-presumption [https://perma.cc/HK35-8J6R]. 
130. The Veto, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-veto.php 
[https://perma.cc/83TB-Y2SF].  
131. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 2.  
132. Id. arts. 1, 2.  
133. Id.  
134. Ultra Vires, WEX, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ultra_vires 
[https://perma.cc/MC5V-23Q5] (defining ultra vires).  
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a permanent members was created by the Charter, so permanent 
members necessarily cannot have powers going beyond those conferred 
by the Charter.135 
This argument, as to limitations to veto use provided by the 
Charter (and similar legal arguments) has already been taken up by a 
number of states in formal statements at the UN.136 Such statements 
are an important indication that states see veto use in the face of 
atrocity crimes as problematic as a matter of international law, which 
is substantially different from the view that veto restraint is or should 
 
135. See U.N. Charter art. 2 
136. For example, Egypt has stated that “[t]he use of the veto undermines the 
implementation of the provisions of the Charter and of international law.” 
U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8262d mtg. at 39, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8262 (May 17, 
2018) (emphasis added) (transcribing a debate entitled “Upholding 
International Law within the Context of the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security”).   Mexico stated that “the veto in situations where 
mass atrocities are committed is an abuse of the law that can trigger 
international responsibility for the State committing them and an abuse 
that leaves the Organization under the sad shadow of paralysis and 
irrelevance.”  Id. at 47 (emphasis added).  Norway stated: “The use of the 
veto to protect narrow national interests in situations of mass atrocities 
is not in line with the spirit of the Charter.”  Id. at 66 (emphasis added).  
Turkey added that the Security Council’s failure to carry out its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security “pursuant to 
Article 24 of the Charter” is a “serious blow to international law.”  Id. at 
80 (emphasis added).  The Netherlands stated that the special privilege 
of the veto ought to be used “with maximum restraint” and that the 
Council would “force itself into irrelevance” and the “rules-based 
international order would break down” if instead this privilege were “used 
as a licence to kill, as a means to obstruct justice, as a way to prevent the 
truth from being told, as a means to hold hostage those who want to 
uphold the principles of the Charter.”  Id. at 15 (emphasis added).   
       The U.S., U.K., and France have articulated similar positions—at least 
regarding veto use related to the situation in Syria—as violating 
international law (U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.8233 (Apr. 14, 2018); U.N. SCOR, 72d Sess., 8073d mtg. at 7, U.N. 
Doc. S/PV.8073 (Oct. 24, 2017)), failing to accord with the “Purposes 
and Principles” of the Charter (U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8231st mtg. at 10–
11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8231 (Apr. 13, 2018)), an abuse of the veto power 
(U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8228th mtg. at 5–6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8228 (Apr. 
10, 2018); U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8164th mtg. at 5–6, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.8164 (Jan. 23, 2018)), undermining of global norms (U.N. SCOR, 
73d Sess., 8228th mtg. at 5–6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8228 (Apr. 10, 2018)), a 
failure to exercise the duties required of a permanent member of the 
Security Council (U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8231st mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.8231 (Apr. 13, 2018); U.N. SCOR, 72d Sess., 8105th mtg. at 7, U.N. 
Doc. S/PV.8105 (Nov. 16, 2017); U.N. SCOR, 72d Sess., 7922d mtg. at 
3–4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7922 (Apr. 12, 2017)), and a violation of 
international obligations to take action against chemical weapons use 
(U.N. SCOR, 72d Sess., 7923d mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7923 (Apr. 12, 
2017)). 
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be a “voluntary” matter.  These statements moreover demonstrate that 
states have not acquiesced to a practice of unlimited veto use in the 
face of atrocity crimes; rather, states are persistently lodging objections 
to such veto use. 
The Veto and Foundational Treaties 
Third, one might focus on the treaty obligations of individual 
permanent member states. For instance, under the Genocide 
Convention there is an obligation to “prevent” genocide.137 The 
“prevention” obligation was at issue in the Bosnia v. Serbia case before 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).138 Under the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions, there is also in Common Article 1 an obligation 
for states parties to “ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions in all 
circumstances.”139  
If all permanent members are parties to both the Genocide 
Convention and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (which they are),140 
is it legally acceptable to veto freely in the face of genocide, “grave 
breaches,” “Common Article 3” war crimes, or other violations of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions? 
Examining the ICJ’s Bosnia v. Serbia decision, the Court held that 
a state must do what is in its power to prevent “genocide,” depending 
on its ability to influence.141 Under that standard, the permanent 
members should have a particularly strong responsibility, as might a 
country intervening in a situation or one with ties to the regime in 
question.142 A permanent member who is both intervening and/or has 
ties to the regime would presumably have the highest level of 
 
137. Genocide Convention, supra note 15, art. 1. 
138. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and 
Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 438 (Feb. 26).  The ruling in 
the case of The Gambia et al against Myanmar also rested on the same 
obligation. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Provisional 
Measures Order, para. 79 (Int’l Ct. of Just. Jan. 23, 2020). 
139. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 16, Common Article I.  
140. See Status of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=I
V-1&chapter=4&clang=_en [perma.cc/Y4L5-DRN7]  (listing the parties 
to the Genocide Convention); Treaties, States Parties, and 
Commentaries, INT’L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_treatySelected=380
&xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties [perma.cc/9S5Y-CCTU] 
(listing the parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions).   
141. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. at 221.   
142. See generally id.  
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responsibility because its actions (or lack thereof) could have the 
greatest impact on what is happening on the ground. 
Another interesting facet of the ICJ’s Bosnia v. Serbia decision is 
the finding that Serbia had an obligation to prevent genocide in 
Bosnia—another state.143  Thus, the Genocide Convention imposes not 
only an obligation for a state to prevent genocide on a state’s own 
territory; the obligation has extraterritorial applicability.144 The ICJ 
has held that the same is true of the obligation to “ensure” respect for 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.145 
Thus, an argument can be made that the individual permanent 
member countries using vetoes in the face of genocide, “grave breaches,” 
Common Article 3 violations (or probably the Geneva Conventions 
more broadly)146 are violating their individual treaty obligations. These 
obligations do not cease by virtue of a country sitting on the Security 
Council.  (These treaties also impose certain obligations on the elected 
members of the Security Council, as well as states more broadly, 
including in their bilateral relations.) 
 
143. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bos. & Herz. v. Yugo.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 
I.C.J. 595, ¶ 31 (July 11) (“[T]he obligation each state . . . has to prevent 
and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the 
Convention.”).  
144. Id.  
145. The ICJ recognized the extraterritorial applicability of Common Article 
1 in both the Wall and Nicaragua cases. See Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 158 (July 9); Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 220 
(June 27).  
146. See Knut Dӧrmann & Jose Serralvo, Common Article 1 to the Geneva 
Conventions and the Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian 
Law Violations, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 707, 735 (2014) (“[Common 
Article] 1 epitomizes the commitment of States to avoid [International 
Humanitarian Law (“IHL”)] violations taking place in the future.  It does 
so by creating a framework whereby States not party to a particular 
armed conflict must use every means at their disposal to ensure that the 
belligerents comply with the Geneva Conventions and [Additional 
Protocol] 1, and probably the whole body of IHL.”) (emphasis added).  
Protocols I and III also have similar obligations to “ensure respect for” 
their provisions, so similar arguments would apply to the extent the 
permanent members are parties to those conventions. See Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1, June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of an Additional 
Distinctive Emblem art. 1, Dec. 8, 2005, 75 UNTS 135.  
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One might make a similar argument for crimes against humanity, 
but the treaty on crimes against humanity is in drafting,147 so one would 
need to construct a similar argument by focusing on erga omnes 
obligations,148 general obligations to cooperate,149 and obligations of 
good faith.150 
One caveat—needed only as to this third (treaty-based) 
argument—is that one has to also work around Article 103 of the UN 
Charter, which basically provides that obligations under treaties can be 
trumped by obligations created under the Charter.151 Here, one might 
argue, however, that the Genocide Convention and 1949 Geneva 
Conventions are not simply any treaties but foundational treaties, so 
rather than viewing these treaties and Article 27 (allowing the veto) to 
be read in a way that is conflicting, one should adopt a “harmonious 
interpretation” whereby veto use needs to be consistent with these 
foundational treaty obligations.152 Or one might formulate it that the 
obligations under these treaties embody the “Purposes and Principles” 
of the UN, and, therefore, pursuant to Article 24(2), Security Council 
 
147. See Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Humanity, Adopted by the International Law Commission 
at its Seventy-First Session and Submitted to the General Assembly as 
Part of the Commission’s Report Covering the Work of that Session, UN 
Doc. A/74/10, 
https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=./ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_
articles/7_7_2019.pdf&lang=EF.  
148. For discussion of what states must do to fulfill obligations erga omnes, 
see Bassiouni, supra note 113.  
149. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 112, Commentary on arts. 40–41; Marko 
Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 553, 571 
(2006) (“[S]tates have a duty to prevent and punish genocide in exactly 
the same way as they have to prevent and punish crimes against humanity 
or other massive human rights violation.”).  
150. Good faith is mandated not only by UN Charter Article 2(2)—as one of 
the U.N.’s Principles—but also as a general principle of international 
law.  See, e.g., Andreas R. Ziegler & Jorun Baumgartner, Good Faith as 
a General Principle of (International) Law, in ANDREW D. MITCHELL, M. 
SORNARAJAH & TANIA VOON, GOOD FAITH AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW 9–36 (2015); Andrew J. Carswell, Unblocking the UN Security 
Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution, 18 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 453, 
471 (citing OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 346 (Hersch Lauterpacht 
ed., 1955)) (discussing the general requirement of states to act in good 
faith). 
151. U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations 
under the present Charter shall prevail.”).  
152. See Bilgic, supra note 129 (describing the meaning of harmonious 
interpretation).  
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members must respect these treaties.153 Thus, it is not so clear the 
Security Council permanent members are free to act in complete 
disregard of these foundational treaty obligations.154 
Conclusion 
In summation, these or similar legal arguments should be seriously 
considered. The arguments could be particularly helpful to the elected 
members of the Council, bolstering the reasons to oppose veto use while 
there are ongoing atrocity crimes. One could even imagine the General 
Assembly putting a request to the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion on a 
question such as:  does existing international law contain limitations on 
the use of the veto power by permanent members of the UN Security 
Council in situations where there is ongoing genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and/or war crimes?  The General Assembly might 
alternatively consider confirming its understanding of such hard law 
concepts directly in a General Assembly resolution.  In the meanwhile, 
states at the UN could intensify what many have already been doing, 
which is speaking out critically at the UN each time the veto is used in 
violation of these existing legal norms.  No longer should the UN system 
tolerate the veto being used in a way that essentially facilitates or 
allows the continuing perpetration of atrocities.  
 
 
153. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 2. 
154. For example, while the Security Council may authorize use of force under 
Chapter VII, Article 42, one would not expect the Security Council to 
authorize force in a way that constitutes genocide, that suspends the 
operation of IHL in a particular conflict, or that violations foundational 
IHL principles such as distinction and proportionality. 
